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ABSTRACT
This paper compares estimates of the social rate of return to education for
Indigenous Australians with those for non-Indigenous Australians. The
social rate of return measures the net benefits to society of educating its
citizens. If education is treated as an investment by society in its people,
then Australian society will be made better off by an increase in
educational investment as long as the social rate of return is higher than
that for other public investments. This paper provides a discussion of the
concept of the social rate of return to education and some estimates for
Indigenous Australians.
Higher levels of education, in general, lead to an increased probability of
finding employment and higher levels of income in employment. Hence,
an increased level of education for an Indigenous person would be of
advantage in economic terms; the private rate of return to education is
likely to be quite high. In addition, we argue that increasing education has
important social benefits (so-called 'externalities') for Indigenous people
and society in general: improved education would lead to better nutrition,
better living conditions, better access to health services, and hence a
longer and healthier life. This means that productivity would be higher for
Indigenous people and they would have higher incomes over a longer
period of time. In addition, we argue that improved levels of education
have the capacity to contribute to a decrease in the numbers of Indigenous
people who are imprisoned, and thus lead to a direct reduction in the costs
of imprisonment. Thus, increased education increases the earnings span,
decreases prison costs and hence increases the social rate of return. We
find that the social rate of return for education is generally higher for
Indigenous Australians than for non-Indigenous Australians. This
suggests, from a public policy perspective, that government should
allocate increased funding for the education of Indigenous people since
this social rate of return is greater than the Department of Finance
recommended cut-off rates for government investment projects.
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Foreword
From time to time Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
(CAEPR) staff collaborate with other academics at The Australian National
University in policy-oriented research. This discussion paper is the result
of such a collaboration between Ms Jin Liu, Research Officer at CAEPR
and Dr Raja Jununkar, Reader in the Public Policy Program, also at The
Australian National University. Both Dr Jununkar and Ms Liu have
disciplinary training in economics, and the issue examined in this
discussion paper is of specific interest to economists and economic
planners. For the first time, they estimate the social rate of return for
Indigenous Australians and compare this to the corresponding rate for other
Australians. Their finding is that the social rate of return to education for
Indigenous Australians is somewhat higher than for non-Indigenous
Australians. This suggests, from a macro-level public policy perspective,
that government allocation of funds to Indigenous education makes sense
because the social rate of return to society of such expenditure exceeds the
Commonwealth Department of Finance's recommended rate of return for
government investment projects.
This finding certainly concurs with, and supplements, a growing body of
research, much of which has been produced by CAEPR staff, that indicates
that human capital investment results in improved employment (and
associated income) outcomes for Indigenous Australians. It is certainly
important from a public policy perspective that it is now established that
both private and social rates of returns are positive for Indigenous people.
TheT research reported here is somewhat different from most CAEPR work
precisely because of its more macro-level analysis that examines the
economic value of government spending to Australian society generally. It
is likely to be of great interest to academic and central agency audiences,
but of less interest to Indigenous regional and community sectors.
Professor Jon Altman
Series Editor
December 1996
The aim of this paper is to compare estimates of the social rate of return to
education for Indigenous Australians with those for non-Indigenous
Australians.1 The social rate of return is calculated by economists to
measure the net benefits to society of educating its citizens. If education is
treated as an investment by society in its people, then Australian society
should be better off by increasing educational investment as long as the
social rate of return is higher than that for other public investments.
Although there are numerous studies of the private rate of return to
education (that is, the return accruing to individuals) for several countries
and for different time periods, there are very few studies of the social rate
of return. The distinctive contribution of this paper is to provide a
discussion of the concept of the social rate of return to education and to
provide some estimates for IndigenousAustralians.
Our paper extends the private rate of return estimation to consider social
costs and benefits.2 Most people consider that education plays a very
important role in society. Education is considered to lead to a more
fulfilling life, and the ability to participate in all aspects of a modern
society. In the language of John Herron, the new Coalition Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, improved education for
Indigenous people is the key to 'empowering' them (Herron 1996). Higher
levels of education, in general, lead to an increased probability of finding
employment and obtaining higher levels of income. Hence, other things
being equal, an increased level of education for an Indigenous person
would be of advantage to that person, and the private rate of return to
education is likely to be quite high. In addition, we argue that increasing
one's level of education has important social benefits (so-called
'externalities') for Indigenous people and society in general: improved
education has the capacity to lead to better nutrition, better living
conditions, access to health services, and hence a longer and healthier life
(increased life expectancy). This means that productivity would be higher
for Indigenous people and they would have higher incomes over a longer
period of time. In addition, we argue that improved levels of education
have the capacity to contribute to a decrease in the numbers of Indigenous
people who are imprisoned, and thus lead to a direct reduction in the costs
of imprisonment. Thus, increased education increases the earnings span,
decreases prison costs and hence increases the social rate of return.
We use data from the 1991 Census of Population and Housing to estimate
the likely earnings of a person with differing levels of education and work
experience at different ages. We then use these estimates to project into the
future the additional earnings s/he would expect to earn if s/he had spent
some additional time in education. We then estimate extra social benefits
and social costs involved to calculate a rate of return to the investment in
education. This is analogous to working out a rate of profit on investing in
(say) a new factory. Not surprisingly, this is a controversial area and we
highlight the limitations of our analysis in Appendix A2.
Investing in people
Although it is common for us to think about spending more time studying
so that we may get a better and more highly paid job, economists have
attempted to formalise the idea that we are investing in human beings. One
of the first such discussions was in Becker (1964). He discussed the theory
of human capital, arguing that we can consider the decision to spend a
longer time in educational institutions as a form of investment which was
similar to investing in (say) a factory or a new cafe. If we are considering
whether to invest $1,000 in buying (say) a new farm machine, we need to
work out whether we would increase our farm revenue by a large enough
amount. Clearly, a simple alternative would be to put the $1,000 in a bank
account and earn interest on the deposit. Unless the purchase of the farm
machinery leads to earning at least as much as the interest rate from the
bank, it would not seem worthwhile.
In the same way, Becker suggested that, if we consider the additional
income from staying on for a little longer in school or college and
compared it to the costs of education, we could work out the rate of profit
(or the rate of return). The costs of education for a person are not only the
extra costs of tuition fees, books, and other direct costs of staying on in
additional education but also the income that the person will not be earning
while studying. These forgone earnings can be a very significant cost for,
say, a three-year degree, if this rate of return exceeds the market rate of
interest s/he invests in her/his education. Of course the individual may not
carry out these calculations very precisely, but may simply make some
guesses when making a decision. In general s/he would expect to have a
greater probability of finding work and getting a more highly paid job. The
exact rate of return (or rate of profit) for different levels of education are
likely to be different for different people. In the analysis below we are only
considering the average rate of return. If these calculations are carried out
simply in terms of what extra income an individual would get from
education and the additional costs that the individual incurs, we call the
rate of profit on education the 'private1 rate of return. The precise method
for carrying out these calculations is discussed in Appendix Al.
There is a marginal and average rate of return to investment on education:
a rate of return can be 'marginal' where it refers to an additional level of
schooling, while the 'average' refers to the comparison between
discontinuous levels of schooling. There are ex-post and ex-ante rates of
return: the ex-post rate would be a historical one referring to the earnings
of a cross-section of the labour force at a particular point in time. In
contrast, the ex-ante rate should refer to the expected earnings of new
graduates. The relationship between costs and benefits is expressed in
terms of the ratio between the present value of costs and the present value
of expected future benefits, or in terms of the rate of return on investment.
The purpose of any cost-benefit analysis is to compare the opportunity cost
of a project with the expected benefits, measured in terms of the additions
to income that will accrue in the future as a result of the investment.
Investing in people: a social perspective
Human capital theory, with all its qualifications, is sometimes extended to
estimate a social rate of return to education. Most studies simply use the
pre-tax earnings in these calculations (instead of post-tax earnings as in the
private rate of return estimates) and include not only the private costs of
education, but also the full costs of education for the government sector.
Since the costs of education are in the early part of the lifecycle and are
much larger for society than for the individual (since in most countries the
government subsidises education), the social rate of return is usually much
lower than the private rate of return.
Information on taxes enables the distinction to be made between the social
and private benefits of education. For example, if the before-tax earnings
of a university graduate employed in the competitive sector of the
economy is W per year, one can reasonably assume that this approximates
the value society places on a graduate. However, if the graduate has to pay
t per cent in taxes, then the benefit the individual realises is only W(l-t).
The logic of using gross earnings in a social rate of return calculation is
that, although taxes are paid out of the individual's pocket, gross earnings
reflect the addition to society's production and hence welfare. Gross
earnings are a better reflection of the contribution the individual makes to
the productivity of society.
However, since the social rate of return measured using this method is
lower than the private rate, it is argued by some that the government should
decrease its investment in education. In general, if we are estimating the
social rate of return we must allow for all social costs (including the
forgone earnings of students) and social benefits and then compare the
social rate of return with the opportunity cost of investing in education. If
alternative government projects provide a lower social rate of return, there
is an argument to expand education.3
The private returns aspect considers the relation between the costs incurred
by private individuals in obtaining education and the benefits they, as
individuals, derive from this education. The social rate of return includes
the impact which one person's education can have on the welfare of others
- for example, a reduction in delinquency and an improvement in standards
of social responsibility (Johnes 1993). The increased earnings from
education generate not only private benefits but also social benefits in the
form of public goods paid for by these increased earnings, and savings in
public welfare costs (McMahon 1987a, 1987b). The external benefits of
education are those benefits to society that are above and beyond the
private benefits realised by the individual decision-maker, that is, the
student and the family. External benefits to others that may be postulated
include, for example, the satisfaction of living in a society with functioning
democratic institutions and their related freedoms, lower crime rates, more
books, more newspapers, and more literature.
If we are to define the social rate of return to education properly, we need
to know the addition to society's welfare of an additional unit of education
for (say) one person. If we use an individualistic welfare function (society's
welfare is simply the sum of individual welfare), then if an individual gets
additional income due to more education it would increase social welfare
and hence increase the social rate of return. If, however, this additional
income is simply compensated by someone else getting a lower income
then society's welfare would be unchanged unless there is some explicit
weighting given to income distribution. Another social welfare function
proposed by Rawls (1971) argues that society's welfare depends on the
welfare of the least well-off member of society. Since Indigenous people
are by far the worst-off members of society, anything that improves their
welfare improves society's welfare in the Rawlsian sense.4
In addition to the increased individual income, society may benefit from
the additional education by increasing the benefit to other people in
society. Thus, it is often argued that a more educated society can introduce
new technology more easily. These 'externalities' are difficult to quantify.
However, there is a large literature on the macroeconomic productivity
benefits of education which suggests that there are significant externalities
(see Denison 1962; World Bank 1993). Ideally, we should also include in
social benefits the 'consumption benefits' of education, which are also
difficult to quantify.
There are basically three types of benefits that belong to the social but not
to the private domain. They include:
i the additional income stream which the individual obtains from
additional education. This should be included as a social benefit as
long as education is actually increasing the productivity of the
person. This means that if education is simply a signalling device or
is used as credentialism then some of the income stream is not a
social benefit. In our estimates below we assume that increased
education increases the productivity of the worker and hence is a
social benefit as well. Tax payments associated with the educational
benefit, (that is, income taxes paid out of one's lifetime income
stream) should be included in social benefit;
ii 'external' benefits, which are those benefits that are due to the
educational investment but that the individual cannot capture. An
example of the external benefits of education is the ability of the
government to rely on individual filing of income tax returns, which
would be impossible to achieve without general literacy (Cohn and
Geske 1990). Another externality would be the impact of increased
education on the health of the community and hence an increase in
life expectancy. An important externality for Indigenous people may
be that increased education decreases the probability of being
imprisoned and hence decreasing costs for society of the prison
system; and
iii indirect and intangible benefits to education would include the
increases in productivity and incomes of workers other than those
who receive education, whether through the diffusion of skills or the
reorganisation of work procedures; education promotes technical
change (and thus, ultimately productivity and output growth) in
various ways ranging from the undertaking of research and
development to the spread of knowledge through literacy; education
increases allocative efficiency, by increasing the flexibility and
mobility of the labour force, in response to changes in the demand
for labour; education brings about many other gains of a social as
well as economic character, including increased social cohesion,
stability and democratic values.
The social costs are the real issue involved in education. If we assume
market prices reflect equilibrium social opportunity costs,5 then we should
include the additional costs of education, the forgone income of an
individual, and any other social costs. In our analysis we allow education
to increase the life expectancy of Indigenous people, hence increasing the
social benefits as they have a longer period over which they are earning an
income. Another way we attempt to allow for externalities in our analysis
is by allowing education to lower the probability of Indigenous people
being imprisoned. We argue that, since a significant proportion of
Indigenous people are imprisoned (especially younger males), if society
increases the education of Indigenous people there will be fewer people
who go to prison (there is a clear negative association between education
levels and probability of being imprisoned).6 If we now estimate the social
costs as being lower due to the increased education levels, then we would
find that the social rate of return would be higher. We do not make any
allowance for the fact that if there is a decrease in the levels of criminal
activity due to increased education there would also be increased benefits
to the potential victims of crime and to society in general. Hence, any
estimate we provide for the social rate of return would be lower bounds to
the 'true' social rate of return. Table 1 summarises some of the potential
costs and benefits.7
Table 1. Private and social costs and benefits.
Benefits Costs
Private
While in school
Part-time after tax earnings
While in the labour force
After tax earnings
Social
While in school
Part-time before tax earnings
While in the labour force
Before tax earnings for a longer
period of time
Externalities
Better democracy
Increased technological change
Private
Direct
Tuition and incidental schooling costs
Indirect
Forgone after tax earnings
Social
Direct
Total schooling costs
Indirect
Forgone earnings before tax
Externalities
Lower prison costs
Source: Adapted from Psacharopoulos (1969).
The data and methods
The data used for this study are derived from the 1991 Census. As there are
significant differences between the earnings of native-born Australians and
overseas-born Australians, we have focused simply on comparisons of
Indigenous people with other native-born Australians. Regression
equations have been estimated and used to calculate the internal rate of
return to an additional year of schooling and to the completion of a post-
schooling qualification for males and females aged 15-64 years in full-time
and part-time employment (these results are presented in Appendix A3).
The results for other Australians have been derived from the 1 per cent
public-use sample of the census and those for Indigenous Australians from
the full Aboriginal sub-file of the 1991 census. The 1 per cent public-use
sample of the population census includes a very small number of
Indigenous adults, which would not provide sufficient degrees of freedom
for econometric estimation of earnings functions. The Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) ran the regression equations on the full sub-file of
Indigenous Australians.
The private benefits of education are the additional earnings of the higher
level of education compared to the previous level of education, and are
based on the predicted earnings for both groups. The private costs of
investing in education are additional incidental school-related costs
incurred by individuals, such as direct costs of tuition fees and books,
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) charges for those at
university, and forgone incomes net of income tax. These forgone earnings
are a significant cost in the earlier part of the life cycle and hence have a
large impact on the calculated private rate of returns. In calculating these
private rates of return, we also allow for the fact that students from low-
income households are eligible for AUSTUDY and ABSTUDY (Daly and
Liu Jin 1995). Since the earnings are estimated from cross-sectional data,
we have allowed for increases in wages over time due to general
productivity growth in the economy. These growth rates are estimated over
1986 to 1991 for each educational level and assumed to apply to
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.8 In addition, we have also
allowed the probability of employment to be affected by the increased
education, hence increasing the expected future incomes because of
improved levels of education.
We have treated the social benefits as including the private benefits of
additional incomes (but taken as gross earnings, rather than net earnings)
assuming that there is no difference between market wages and shadow
wages (equilibrium wages from a societal point of view). We argue that
increased education not only increases the income stream at each date in
the future but also extends the life of Indigenous people and hence their
working life. This externality of increased working life expectancy is
applied in estimating social rates of return.9 The average life expectancy
for male and female Indigenous persons was assumed to be 44 years and
46 years respectively10 and, for other Australians, a working life
terminating at 64 years. 'Life expectancy for Aboriginal males was
estimated to be 16 to 18 years shorter than for non-Aboriginal males during
1990-92; the gap was slightly wider for Aboriginal females' (Bhatia and
Anderson 1995: 12). The differences of rates of return between working
life expectancy of 44 years (female) or 46 years (male) and increasing
working life expectancy to 64 years for Indigenous Australians are only
marginal because of the process of discounting lifetime earning after the
peak earning capacity.''
For the social costs of education, we have allowed for the total resource
costs to society. Besides opportunity costs incurred by individuals, namely,
income forgone during school attendance, there are additional incidental
school-related costs incurred by individuals for private rate of return such
as direct costs of tuition fees and books and HECS charges for those at
university. In addition, we include government costs for education per
person (at all levels of government) for those in post-compulsory
secondary education, which includes school costs incurred by society, that
is, teachers' salaries, supplies, interest and depreciation on capital and
society's costs which are normally defrayed though taxation. Income
support to individuals under AUSTUDY and ABSTUDY are considered as
transfer payments rather than as part of social cost to education. The only
element which would be relevant would be the real resource costs involved
in administering such allowances. As we have inadequate information
about these administrative costs (and in any case they are likely to be
small) we have ignored them in our estimates.
Another issue that we explicitly assumed as an externality is that education
lowers crime and hence decreases the numbers of people imprisoned,
which decreases the prison costs for society.12 Appendix Table Bl shows
that 3.4 per cent of Indigenous males are in prison compared to 0.18 per
cent of other male Australians. Appendix Table B2 provides information
on the distribution of the percentage of prisoners by age group. This shows
that the highest percentage of prisoners for males are at age 20-24 years
and for females at 25-29 years, but for both males and females most of
them are concentrated in the age range 20-40 years. Appendix Table B3
provides information by labour market status and shows that most
prisoners are likely to be unemployed or of unknown labour market status.
Appendix Table B4 shows that people with lower levels of education are
more likely to be arrested. We estimate the social rates of return allowing
for this dimension by assuming that Indigenous Australians have the same
employment probability and the same percentage of prisoners as other
Australians so that average lifetime earnings are adjusted accordingly.
The results and interpretation
In this section we provide estimates of the private and social rates of return
to additional years of education. The private rate of return is likely to
influence the decision of individuals to continue their education if they
choose to maximise their lifetime incomes. It is probably true that a
significant proportion of Indigenous people make this choice, especially if
they live a traditional lifestyle in remote regions. However, the social rate
of return builds on this private rate of return by including various social
costs and benefits discussed earlier. For a government, it is important to
know what would be the additional benefit to society of increasing
expenditure on additional education for (say) Indigenous people. As
discussed earlier, if the social rate of return to additional expenditure on
education is large and greater than some alternative public investment, then
the government should expand education.
The results and interpretation reported in this section estimate the internal
private and social rates of return to education based on predicted income
from estimates based on earning functions regressions (see Appendix
Tables Al and A2) with appropriate adjustments for additional costs and
benefits. Results are reported for both males and females, Indigenous and
other Australians.
Table 2 presents comparisons of the private rate of return to education for
Indigenous and other Australian males and females with adjustments for
the proportion of students receiving AUSTUDY or ABSTUDY (Appendix
Table A3). Seventeen per cent paid HECS in advance with 15 per cent
discount in 1991 and 83 per cent of students paid HECS after graduation
above a certain income level. ABSTUDY or AUSTUDY payment is
calculated as an average of the payment for maximum 'living at home',
maximum 'living away' and maximum 'independent'.
Table 2. Private rate of return to education with AUSTUDY or
ABSTUDY aged 15-64 years, 1991 (assuming proportional income
support, adjusting for mean wage growth rates and employment
probabilities.
Aboriginality
and sex
Females
(a) Other 64
(b) Indigenous
(c) Indigenous
as Other*
Als1
15/16
Per cent
18.3
44 11.5
same
12.6
Als
15/17
Per cent
14.7
15.7
15.0
Als
15/18
Per cent
9.9
11.8
9.7
Age 172
Cert.
Per cent
3.4
14.9
8.3
Age 173 Age 18-204Age 18-215^6
Dip.
Per cent
12.6
26.4
22.9
Degree
Per cent
12.4
19.2
16.7
Degree
Per cent
13.4
20.6
17.6
Males
(d) Other 64 23.2 16.9 12.3 13.6 16.7 19.6 19.7
(e) Indigenous 46 10.7 14.4 12.4 27.6 28.5 21.8 23.3
(f) Indigenous same
as Other* 10.7 12.6 9.8 26.7 25.2 20.9 20.8
(a) Other Australian females with working life terminating at 64 years with own employment
probability adjustment.
(b) Indigenous females with working life terminating at 44 years with own employment probability
adjustment.
(c) Indigenous females same as Other Australian females in terms of employment probabilities.
(d) Other Australian males with working life terminating at 64 years with own employment
probability adjustment.
(e) Indigenous males with working life terminating at 46 years with own employment probability
adjustment.
(0 Indigenous males same as Other Australian males in terms of employment probabilities.
* Rows (c) and (0 are virtually unchanged if we allow for Indigenous workers to work until 64
years of age like Other Australians.
1. Als: Age left school.
2. Assuming a certificate (Cert.) involves two years of full-time study.
3. Assuming a diploma (Dip.) involves two years of full-time study.
4. Assuming a degree (Age 18-20/Degree) involves three years of full-time study.
5. Assuming a degree (Age 18-2 I/Degree) involves four years of full-time study.
6. Age 18-2I/Degree is under assumption that the income growth rate equals the average growth rate
over the period 1986-91. It is also assumed that we have full employment.
Table 3 presents comparisons of the social rate of return to education for
Indigenous and other Australian males and females. All these results are
adjusted for mean wage growth rates and different employment
probabilities and externalities. The first half of the Tables relates to the rate
of return to continuing secondary education; the second part of these
Tables relates to post-secondary qualifications. The social cost, that is, per
capita expenditure in 1991 for education, is highest for higher education
($6,797),13 then $3,329 for schooling and $1,920 for Technical and Further
Education (TAPE) college (ABS 1991). Table 4 provides information on
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the differences between the social rate of return and private rate of return
by gender.
Table 3. Social rate of return to education, aged 15-64 years, 1991
(adjusting for mean wage growth rates, employment and crime
probabilities).
Ais1 Als Als Agel?2 Age 173 Age 18-204Age 18-215-6
Aboriginality 15/16 15/17 15/18 Cert. Dip. Degree Degree
and sex Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
Females
(a) Other 64 15.5 11.7 7.4 2.3 11.0 8.9 10.9
(b) Indigenous 44* 9.1 9.7 6.7 12.0 19.2 15.3 17.5
(c) Indigenous same
as Other 11.2 11.2 6.8 6.3 16.3 13.5 15.0
(d) Indigenous with
crime cost 9.3 9.8 6.8 12.2 19.3 15.5 17.6
Males
(e) Other 64 20.4 14.8 10.9 13.4 14.8 18.1 18.9
(f) Indigenous 46* 8.9 9.5 8.2 22.6 21.3 19.0 20.8
(g) Indigenous same
as Other 9.7 9.6 7.5 22.0 18.9 18.2 18.8
(h) Indigenous with
crime cost 9.2 9.7 8.4 22.8 21.6 19.1 21.0
(a) Other Australian females with working l ife terminating at 64 years with own employment
probability adjustment.
(b) Indigenous females with working life terminating at 46 years with own employment probability
adjustment.
(c) Indigenous females same as Other Australian females in terms of employment probabilities.
(d) Indigenous females same as (b) but with additional adjustment by crime cost.
(e) Other Australian males with working life terminating at 64 years with own employment
probability adjustment.
(f) Indigenous males with working life terminating at 46 years with own employment probability
adjustment.
(g) Indigenous males same as Other Australian males in terms of employment probabilities.
(h) Indigenous males same as (f) but with additional adjustment by crime cost.
Rows (b) and (f) are virtually unchanged if we allow for Indigenous workers to work until 64
years of age like Other Australians.
1. Als: Age left school.
2. Assuming a certificate (Cert.) involves two years of full-time study.
3. Assuming a diploma (Dip.) involves two years of full-time study.
4. Assuming a degree (Age 18-20/Degree) involves three years of full-time study.
5. Assuming a degree (Age 18-2 I/Degree) involves four years of full-time study.
6. Age 18-2I/Degree is under assumption that the income growth rate equals the average growth rate
over the period 1986-91. It is also assumed that we have full employment.
The private rate of return in Table 2 provides calculated rates for other
Australians in row (a) assuming that the incomes are expected incomes
using the predicted earnings for people with the appropriate levels of
education and weighted by the probabilities of employment for each age
and education category. It is assumed that other Australians work until they
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reach the age of 65 years. In each cell, the income component is the
(mathematical) expected value of additional earnings for the level of
education (compared to the previous level of education). In other words,
we take the additional earnings times the probability of employment plus
the unemployment benefit times the probability of unemployment. Row (b)
provides calculated rates of return for Indigenous people with a life
expectancy of 44 years for females14 and with the employment
probabilities of that group. Row (c) provides similar information, assuming
a scenario that Indigenous females have similar employment probabilities
to Other Australians. Rows (d), (e) and (f) give similar calculations for
males who are assumed to work until the age of 46 years. Sensitivity
analyses for private rates of return (such as assuming a student with or
without ABSTUDY or AUSTUDY) are attached in Appendix C, Table Cl
and Table C2.
Indigenous people with low levels of education have lower private rates of
return to education than non-Indigenous Australians suggesting that for
this group there may be significant difficulties in finding employment, and
they may have lower wage rates if they do find employment. This may be
due to discrimination. It is interesting to see, however, that Indigenous
people with higher levels of education have higher employment
probabilities than other Australians. This suggests that, since only a small
minority of Indigenous people have higher levels of education they are in a
favourable position in the labour market. If everyone from this group had a
higher level of education, we might have to adjust the employment
probabilities towards that of non-Indigenous Australians to get a better idea
of how the rate of return would appear. At present, highly educated
Indigenous people may have relatively high employment probabilities
compared to non-Indigenous Australians due to some kind of scarcity
value. However, we have not made such corrections.
Let us focus on the private rate of return for males, who have a higher
probability of a continuous working life, and hence these estimates are
probably more reasonable for males than for females. When we compare
the private rate of return for different levels of education for a particular
group, we see that for non-Indigenous Australians they seem to follow a U-
shape with high rates for low levels of education, falling for intermediate
levels and then rising for degrees. For Indigenous people, there appears to
be an inverted U-shape: low rates for low levels of education, rising
steeply for intermediate levels, and then falling slightly for degree levels.
This significantly different pattern needs further exploration. It may be a
reflection of greater inequality of earnings amongst Indigenous people
compared to non-Indigenous Australians.
Table 3 provides our estimates of the social rate of return to education for
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. As mentioned earlier, these
estimates use gross earnings, and include all social expenditures on
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education, and allow for an individual's forgone earnings. Rows (c) and (g)
make an adjustment to the calculated rates of return by assuming that the
employment probabilities are the same as for non-Indigenous Australians
and implicitly assuming that the probabilities of being imprisoned are the
same for Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. In addition, for
Indigenous people we have included prison costs, using the probabilities of
being in prison; see rows (d) and (h), (assumed to be the same in 1991 as in
1994, and assuming that the probabilities of being in prison are the same as
being arrested, see Appendix B). This inclusion obviously raises the social
rate of return for Indigenous people, ceteris paribus, since there is reduced
expenditure on prisons due to improved education.15
Table 4. Differences between social and private rates of return to
education, aged 15-64 years, 1991 (assuming full income support,
adjusting for mean wage growth rates, employment and crime
probabilities, and proportional student receiving AUSTUDY or
ABSTUDY).
Als1 Als Als Agel?2 Age 173 Age 18-204 Age 18-215
Aboriginality 15/16 15/17 15/18 Cert. Dip. Degree Degree
and sex Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
Females
(a) Other 64
(b) Indigenous 44
(c) Indigenous same
as Other
(d) Indigenous with
crime cost
Males
(e) Other 64
(f) Indigenous 46
(g) Indigenous same
as Other
(h) Indigenous with
crime cost
-2.9
-2.4
-1.4
-2.3
-2.8
-1.8
-1.0
-1.4
-3.0
-6.0
-3.8
-5.9
-2.1
-4.9
-2.9
-4.7
-2.5
-5.1
-2.9
-5.0
-1.4
-4.1
-2.3
-4.0
-1.1
-2.9
-2.0
-2.7
-0.2
-5.0
-4.7
-4.8
-1.6
-7.2
-6.6
-7.1
-1.9
-7.2
-6.3
-6.9
-3.5
-3.9
-3.2
-3.7
-1.5
-2.8
-2.7
-2.6
-2.5
-3.1
-2.6
-2.9
-0.8
-2.5
-2.0
-2.3
Denotation:
(a) The difference between social and private rate of return for Other Australian females.
(b) The difference between social and private rate of return for Indigenous females.
(c) The difference between social and private rate of return with same employment probability for Indigenous
females.
(d) The difference between social (with additionalcrime cost) and private rate of return for Indigenousfemales.
(e) The difference between social and private rate of return for Other Australian males.
(f) The difference between social and private rate of return for Indigenous males.
(g) The difference between social and private rate of return with same employment probability for Indigenous
males.
(h) The difference between social (with additional crime cost) and private rate of return for Indigenous males.
1. Als: Age left school.
2. Assuming a certificate (Cert.) involves two years of full-time study.
3. Assuming a diploma (Dip.) involves two years of full-time study.
4. Assuming a degree (Age 18-20/Deg.) involves three years of full-time study.
5. Assuming a degree (Age 18-21/Deg.) involves four years of full-time study.
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Table 4 summarises the differences between social and private rates of
return for males and females. This shows clearly that the social rate of
return is lower than the comparable private rate of return. It is interesting to
note that the private rate of return for a degree is extremely high (for both
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people) compared to any alternative
investment that the individual could make. The private rate for staying on
in school until 18 years is also fairly high. It is also interesting to note that
if Indigenous people with education have the same employment probability
as non-Indigenous people then the private rate of return is less than if their
own employment probabilities are used. This is because few Indigenous
people achieve such levels of education and then have higher employment
probabilities than for non-Indigenous people. If we allow education to
decrease the probability of being imprisoned, then the social rate of return
is higher (compare row (b) with row (d) for females, and (f) with (h) for
males).
Although we do not present tables where we allow for Indigenous people
with more education to have an increased life expectancy to equal that of
non-Indigenous Australians, we found that it made very little difference to
the rate of return. This is because the earnings of Indigenous people had
already peaked by the age of 46 years (for males) and 44 years (for
females) and the extra years of declining earnings when discounted made
very little difference.16
Conclusion
In this paper we have provided estimates of private and social rates of
return to education for Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians under
different assumptions. In our analysis we discussed the social benefits of
education for Indigenous people. In particular, we argued that increasing
the levels of education would improve the health of Indigenous people and
hence increase their life expectancy. This increased life expectancy would
increase the number of years that Indigenous people would be working
productively and hence increase the benefits to society. Another important
social benefit, we argued, was that improved education led to a lower
probability of being arrested and hence imprisoned. Following on from
this, we argued that a lowering of imprisonment would increase the
working life of Indigenous people and hence increase society's wellbeing.
In addition, a lower rate of crime would decrease society's expenditure on
policing and prisons, and hence lead to a social improvement.
Using a fairly common methodology for calculating the private benefits of
education, we extended this method to quantify some of the social costs
and benefits and were able to get estimates of the private and social rates of
return to education. Our results show that the rate of return (both private
and social) to education is fairly high. In particular, we pointed out the
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curious result that, as education levels increased, the rate of return
followed a U-shape for non-Indigenous Australians but an inverted U-
shape for Indigenous Australians. This result needs further exploration to
provide an explanation. Our results also show that the social rate of return
is in general lower than the private rate of return, primarily because social
expenditure on education exceeds private expenditure (education is
subsidised by the State). In our estimates of the social rate of return we
argued that we should allow for all social costs and benefits and made a
tentative beginning by allowing education to lower the probability of going
to prison and hence lowering social costs. We also allowed for education to
improve health by allowing life expectancy to increase. Our results show
that making these allowances increases the social rate of return marginally.
In all cases we find that the social rate of return are very high and clearly
exceed the Department of Finance's recommended cut-off rate for public
projects. This analysis suggests that the government should increase its
funding of education for Indigenous people.
Notes
1. The paper is an extension of a previous paper by Daly and Liu (1995) which
provided estimates of the private rate of return to education for Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians.
2. The paper is located firmly in the human capital context, discussed by Becker
(1964), Mincer (1974), Blaug (1970), and Psacharopoulos (1981, 1985), and is
subject to the same limitations as most of the studies in this genre.
3. Strictly speaking, this is true if the marginal social rate of return is high.
However, all estimates of rate of return are the average rates.
4. The Rawlsian Social Welfare Function is based on the idea of the 'veil of
ignorance': if we do not know where in the income distribution we may happen
to fall, we may wish society to help the worst-off person.
5. To the extent this assumption is invalid we would need use shadow prices.
However, that is a huge task which we do not even attempt.
6. In some preliminary research (using data on Indigenous people) we have carried
out there is a significant relationship between the level of education and the
probability of being arrested, controlling for various factors including age and
income. We assume that there is a fairly stable relationship between the
probability of being arrested and being imprisoned.
7. It is of course possible that the increased labour supply of Indigenous labour may
lead to a fall in wages and hence in taxes collected by the government. However,
this is likely to be a very small effect.
8. It is assumed that these growth rates are the same for both groups for each
education ill level.
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9. It is, of course, true that if Indigenous people live longer there may be increased
expenditures on health. However, in most other cases for non-Indigenous people
we think of a longer life as a benefit.
10. This is the life expectancy at birth, not at the relevant age (say) 16 years, which is
likely to be larger. However, we do not have any estimates for life expectancy at
different ages and are therefore unable to make any allowance for these
differences.
11. The peak estimated earnings for Indigenous males are at 44 years compared to
non-Indigenous Australian males whose peak earnings are at 42 years. The peak
estimated earnings for Indigenous females are at 41 years compared to 'Other
Australian' females at 42 years.
12. As mentioned earlier, our preliminary results, using National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Survey data, show such a relationship.
13. Note these costs include an element which covers research in higher education.
It is difficult to allocate what proportion of this should be excluded.
14. Note that Other Australians are assumed to work continuously until the age of 64
years. This is a shaky assumption for males and certainly untrue for females.
However, incomes towards the end of the working life have a very small effect
on the rate of return as they are heavily discounted.
15. Note that these rows cannot be compared to similar rows in Table 2. Ideally, we
should provide a row which shows the social rate of return when we include the
costs of prison and then allow education to decrease these prison costs.
16. When we have discount rates of over 20 per cent, earnings 20 or so years in the
future are almost zero in present value terms. Simple experiments where we
increased the terminal earnings by over a hundred-fold made little difference to
the rate of return.
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Appendix Al. Estimating rate of return
The empirical procedure for estimating the rate of return on education is as
follows: earnings functions are estimated with log of earnings as the
dependent variable and with independent variables which include years of
schooling (or educational dummy variables), work experience (usually
proxied as age minus age left school), and controlling for some
demographic characteristics like marital status, number of children, and so
on. Usually these equations are estimated on cross-section data. It is then
postulated that the expected future earnings would follow the same path as
the pre-existing cross-section estimates. This extrapolation is obviously
based on some strong assumptions, including steady state equilibrium
conditions with no growth in earnings, and no changes in wage
differentials due to changing demand or supply conditions. If we used
longitudinal data it would be an improvement: however, there are very few
studies based on longitudinal data, and since these data do not exist in
Australia we have to rely on cross-section estimates. Ideally, we need to
know the expected future lifetime income stream of each individual,which
is of course not feasible.
These predicted earnings are then used to calculate the rate of return as that
discount rate which makes the present value of the resulting net benefit
stream (the difference between the benefits and costs) equal to zero:
(1)
where u = the additional earnings at each age i associated with
additional education  j ; CtJ = the costs of education at age i associated
with additional education ;'; and Pt = the present value of additional
education j. The rate of return to education is defined as that rate of
discount which equates the sum of the discounted value of benefits to the
sum of the discounted value of costs of education. An alternative method
of computing the rate of return to education is to regress the natural
logarithm of earnings on schooling (Mincer 1974; Willis 1986). The
resulting coefficient of schooling is interpreted as the rate of return.
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Appendix A2. The limitations of estimated rate of return
There are several limitations related to this estimation
i We are comparing the rate of return for a very small group of Indigenous
people with post-secondary and higher levels of education with a much
larger group of non-Indigenous Australians. If the levels of education of
Indigenous people were up to the levels of that of non-Indigenous
Australians, then the wage differentials might change (in a general
equilibrium sense). Hence, we may be over-estimating the rate of return
to education for a general increase in education levels, although they
would be appropriate to an individual increasing her/his level of
education.
ii We have assumed that wage growth between the 1986 and 1991 Censuses
will be continued. We also assumed that this wage growth is identical for
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Since we have used cross-
section estimates to get our predicted earnings, we are implicitly
assuming that existing wage differentials will continue into the indefinite
future. In other words, any changes in behaviour which would increase
the supply of (say) people with degrees does not affect the equilibrium
wage.
iii We make all the usual human capital theory assumptions, including that
individuals choose that investment plan which maximises the present
value of earnings over the life cycle. This assumption is particularly
problematic for Indigenous people. Given the cultural and historical
background of Indigenous people, it is unlikely that they would be
following such an optimising approach.
iv For Indigenous people, the earnings that we have used would not include
non-market earnings such as from hunting and fishing, which would bias
our estimates. In our estimates of earnings functions we have used total
income as the dependent variable which includes the income from
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme
employment for Indigenous people. This may lead to a bias since some
participants in the CDEP scheme appear to have been classified not only
as 'unemployed' but also 'not in the labour force' in the census (Altman
and Daly 1992). We have not included those people who are 'not in labour
force' in our sample.
v The social rate of return is estimated by using observed market earnings
assuming that wages are equal to the value of the marginal product of
labour (labour markets are perfect). If we did not make this assumption
we would have to estimate shadow wages. In a centralised wage
bargaining system like we have in Australia, it is not clear to what extent
the centralised wage bargains simply rubber stamp competitive market
wages or to what extent they introduce distortions. This is another area
which needs further exploration.
vi We have made no corrections for the possibility that there is selection
bias, that is the more educated are of higher ability. We have assumed that
the higher earnings of the more educated simply reflect a return on that
education.
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Appendix A3. Definition of variables list and definitions for earnings
function 1991 Census
All variables for ages from 15 to 64 years (inclusive).
1. Australian Indigenous: Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
2. Australian others: native-born Australians.
3. Age on leaving school (als): dns - did not go to school
als 14 - age left school at 14 or younger
als 15 - age left school at 15
als 16 - age left school at 16
als 17 - age left school at 17
als 18 - age left school at 18
als 19 - age left school at 19 or older.
The omitted age on leaving school grouping is the als 15.
4. Qualification
(1) University degree includes higher degree, post-graduate diploma and
bachelor degree.
(2) Diploma includes undergraduate diploma, associate diploma.
(3) Certificate includes skilled vocational, basic vocational and level of
attainment inadequately described.
(4) The omitted qualification grouping denotes those holding no qualification.
5. Marital status
(1) Married, single, and other (separated, divorced and widowed).
(2) The omitted marital status grouping is single.
6. Dependent children
Number of dependent offspring present from 0 to 8.
7. Language
Takes the value of 1 for those with poor English language skills.
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Table Al. Earnings function for Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians by gender, 1991.
Indigenous
Variables3
Constant
Age
Age squared
Age on leaving schoold
No schooling
<=14 years
16 years
17 years
1 8 years
19 yearsJ
Qualifications'1
Certificate
Diploma
University
degree
Marital status
Married
Other
Dependent children
Language
R2
a. 't' statistics in parentheses.
b. Significant at 1 per cent level.
c. Significant at 5 per cent level.
d. Joint F-test significant at 1 per cent
Males
7.8101
(224.4)b
0.0889
(43.4)"
-0.0010
(-37.fi)*
-0.3834
(-15.4)b
-0.0606
(-5.4)"
0.0519
(5.3)b
0.1208
(10.1)b
0.1591
(9.7)b
-0.0303
(-1.3)
0.3495
(33.7)b
0.4178
(15.4)b
0.5759
(19.4)b
0.1398
(14.9)b
0.0974
(6.6)b
0.0089
(8.0)b
-0.4528
(-19.0)b
0.23
Females
7.4795
(157.8)b
0.0983
(34.1)b
-0.0012
(-29.2)b
-0.2671
(-6.6)b
-0.0425
(-2.6)b
0.1333
(10.7)b
0.2414
(16.7)b
0.2388
(12.0)b
0.0920
(3.3)b
0.2278
(13.3)b
0.4147
(20.4)b
0.5772
(20.3)b
-0.1414
(-11.8)b
0.0537
(3.2)b
0.0242
(17.6)b
-0.3188
(-9.5)b
0.19
Others
Males
7.3264
(l84.5)b
0.1188
(52.7)b
-0.0014
(-49.1)b
-0.2720
(-3.0)b
-0.0412
(-2.7)b
0.1432
(13.0)b
0.1858
(15.7)b
0.1964
(l3.8)b
0.1363
(-6.7)b
0.1702
(18.5)b
0.2997
(16.7)b
0.5226
(38.1)b
0.1628
(13.4)b
0.1056
(5-9)»
0.0167
(13.9)b
0.0978
(0.8)
0.30
Females
6.7494
(131.7)b
0.1243
(40.9)b
-0.0015
(-37.8)b
-0.3452
(-2.16)'
-0.0335
(-1.4)
0.2176
(15.1)b
0.2864
(18.9)b
0.2693
(14.0)b
0.2641
(9.6)b
0.1546
(9.1)b
0.2952
(16.7)b
0.4393
(25.2)b
-0.1524
(-9.8)b
0.1239
(5.8)b
0.0568
(37.9)b
-0.1070
(0.8)
0.26
level (one-side or two-side tests as appropriate).
Source: 1991 Census.
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Table A2. Mean wage and growth rate from 1986-91 for all
Australians, by sex, section-of-State, qualification level and age left
school, 1986 and 1991 Census.
Qualification levels
Total areas
Degree
Diploma
Certificate
Non-qualification
Average
Age left school
Total areas
Als 15
Als 16
Als 17
Als 18
Als 19
Average
1986
Males
32,417
28,761
20,140
14,387
17,719
17,307
18,135
21,384
21,890
23,461
19,186
1991 Growth
Males rate
45,702
35,347
26,307
18,954
23,758
23,074
24,177
28,704
29,155
30,950
25,994
1.41
1.23
1.31
1.32
1.34
1.33
1.33
1.34
1.33
1.32
1.35
1986
Females
19,719
15,440
11,340
7,781
9,266
8,217
9,891
12,613
12,829
13,571
10,142
1991 Growth
Females rate
26,707
20,747
15,091
11,910
14,040
12,658
14,425
17,466
17,550
19,481
15,238
1.35
1.34
1.33
1.53
1.52
1.54
1.46
1.38
1.37
1.44
1.50
Note: Other areas include other urban and rural areas.
1. Assuming that wage rate for Indigenous is same as for others by the level of qualification and by
section-of-State.
2. Average wage growth rate is assumed no discriminationfor Indigenous and marginal productivity
equal to wage rate.
3. Wage growth rate will be calculated from 1986 rather than 1981 and 1991 censuses. There are two
reasons why the 1981 Census can not be used for this purpose: the limited sample for Indigenous
Australians- about 1,500 cases, and no geographic areas divided wage rate for other Australians.
Source: 1986 and 1991 Census.
Table A3. Percentage of recipients of AUSTUDY or ABSTUDY by sex,
age 15-22 years, 1991.
Age
Indigenous
Males Females
ABSTUDY
Other
Males Females
AUSTUDY
16 years
17 years
1 8 years
19 years
20 years
21 years
22 years
56.2
44.9
20.2
14.0
12.2
9.6
9.2
65.0
52.3
24.0
18.5
15.0
13.9
11.8
32.5
22.9
15.5
10.6
7.2
5.1
3.7
35.8
27.5
20.3
14.3
9.0
5.5
3.6
Source: Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs.
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Table Bl. Number and percentage of prisoners, by sex and
Aboriginality, 1991.
Indigenous
Male
Female
Sub-total
Other
Male
Female
Sub-total
Total
Male
Female
Sub-total
Number
2,045
121
2,166
11,716
607
12,323
13,761
728
14,489
Per cent
(94.4)
(5.6)
(100)
(95.1)
(4.9)
(100)
(95.0)
(5.0)
(100)
Number Number
Per 100,000 Percentage
3,403
188
1,739
183
9
95
221
11
115
3.40
0.19
1.74
0.18
0.01
0.10
0.22
0.01
0.12
Notes:
1. The additional crime cost for Indigenous males and female compared with Other Australians are
$1,466 and $81, which is calculated by $45,537 cost per prisoner in 1991 times the difference
percentage 3.22 (male) and 0.18 (female) of prisoners between Indigenous (male or female) and
Other Australians (male or female).
2. The proportional deduction of social benefit from being in prison by level of education is applied,
which causes increased rate of return. The increased rate of return after adjusting for crime cost is
because of widening the stream of lifetime earnings. The widening increased stream of lifetime,
earnings is because of higher probability of being in prison (bigger loss of social benefit). At 15
years left school and at non-qualification among the age groups are both comparative benchmarks
for the increased stream of lifetime earnings.
Source: Walker (1991: 22, 23).
Table B2. Percentage of prisoners by sex and age, all Australians,
1991.
Age group
Persons under 17 years go to juvenile centre.
Source: Walker (1991: 18).
Male Female Total
17 years
18 years
19 years
20-24 years
25-29 years
30-34 years
35-39 years
40-44 years
45-49 years
50-54 years
55-59 years
60-64 years
65 years and over
All years
0.4
2.5
4.1
26.4
21.7
17.1
11.7
7.0
4.3
2.6
1.2
0.7
0.4
100.0
0.3
1.9
3.4
20.2
29.0
21.7
10.2
7.4
3.0
1.9
0.3
0.5
0.1
100.0
0.4
2.4
4.1
26.1
22.0
17.3
11.6
7.0
4.3
2.6
1.2
0.7
0.4
100.0
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Table B3. Number and percentage of prisoners, by sex and known
employment status, all Australians, 1991.
Numbers
Employment status
Employed
Unemployed
Home duties
Student
Other
Unknown
Total
Percentage employment status
Employed
Unemployed
Home duties
Student
Other
Unknown
Total
Male
2,100
3,927
1,013
27
197
7,029
14,293
14.7
27.5
7.1
0.2
1.4
49.2
100.0
Female
64
152
69
14
29
400
728
8.8
20.9
9.5
1.9
4.0
54.9
100.0
Total
2,164
4,079
1,082
41
226
7,429
15,021
14.4
27.2
7.2
0.3
1.5
49.5
100.0
Source: Walker (1991: 32).
Table B4. Percentage of Indigenous Australians arrested by police in
the last five years by age and education, NATSIS 1994.
Years
Males
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
Total
Females
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
Total
AlslS
7.7
10.6
9.7
5.9
5.8
2.6
1.7
0.4
0.1
0.1
44.5
1.6
4.4
28
3.0
1.8
0.6
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
14.3
Alsl6
4.6
9.0
9.0
8.0
2.5
2.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.1
35.8
0.9
2.2
2.3
1.9
1.0
0.7
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
9.4
Alsl7
3.5
11.4
8.1
3.0
2.2
1.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
30.0
0.8
4.1
1.4
1.2
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.7
AlslS
0.9
11.0
6.4
4.9
2.6
0.4
0.5
0.0
0.2
0.0
26.9
0.7
5.2
1.8
1.3
0.6
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
10.1
Degree Diploma Certificate Non-qual.
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.1
0.0
1.3
4.7
0.0
0.0
8.2
0.0
0.0
2.3
10.7
2.1
5.0
0.0
2.7
0.0
0.0
22.8
0.0
2.1
1.2
0.5
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.5
1.5
8.5
8.9
7.7
4.3
3.1
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.0
35.2
0.7
1.7
2.3
2.1
1.3
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
8.6
0.7
13.4
7.4
6.0
5.6
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
34.0
0.2
5.5
0.8
3.5
2.1
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.5
Source: NATSIS 1995.
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Table C2. Private rate of return to education without AUSTUDY or ABSTUDY
aged 15-64 years, (assuming full income support, adjusting for mean wage growth
rates and employment probabilities), 1991.
Aboriginally
and sex
Females
(a) Other 64
(b) Indigenous
(c) Indigenous
as Other
Males
(d) Other 64
(e) Indigenous
(f) Indigenous
as Other
Als1
15/16
Per cent
18.3
44 11.5
same
12.6
23.2
46 10.7
same
10.7
Als
15/17
Per cent
13.5
11.8
12.4
16.0
11.1
10.4
Als
15/18
Per cent
8.8
8.5
7.6
11.5
9.5
8.0
Age 172
Cert.
Per cent
2.7
11.3
5.7
12.4
21.6
21.0
Age 173 Age 18-204Age 18-215'6
Dip.
Per cent
11.3
21.0
18.0
15.5
23.1
20.4
Degree
Per cent
11.6
17.5
15.2
19.0
20.2
19.3
Degree
Per cent
12.8
19.0
16.3
19.1
21.7
19.4
Table C2. Private rate of return to education with AUSTUDY or ABSTUDY aged
15-64 years, (assuming full income support, adjusting for mean wage growth rates
and employment probabilities), 1991.
Aboriginality
and sex
Als1
15/16
Per cent
Als
15/17
Per cent
Als
15/18
Per cent
Age 172
Cert.
Per cent
Age 173
Dip.
Per cent
Agel8-204Agel8-215-6
Degree Degree
Per cent Per cent
Females
(a) Other 64 18.3 19.1 15.4 7.4 20.7 20.2 20.7
(b) Indigenous 44 11.5 21.7 22.8 30.7 48.1 31.9 32.0
(c) Indigenous same
as Other 12.6 18.4 15.0 17.2 39.3 26.9 27.1
Males
(d) Other 64 23.2 20.8 16.8 21.9 25.0 27.8 27.4
(e) Indigenous 46 10.7 18.9 20.5 51.2 46.7 32.4 34.6
(f) Indigenous same
as Other 10.7 15.3 14.2 46.4 40.2 31.4 30.6
(a) Other Australian females 64 years for working life expectancy with own employment probability adjustment.
(b) Indigenous females 44 years for working life expectancy with own employment probabilityadjustment.
(c) Indigenous females same as Other Australian females in terms of employment probabilities.
(d) Other Australian males 64 years for working life expectancy with own employment probabilityadjustment.
(e) Indigenous males 44 years for working life expectancy with own employmentprobability adjustment.
(f) Indigenous males same as Other Australians males in terms of employment probabilities.
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Als: Age left school.
Assuming a certificate (Cert.) involves two years of full-time study.
Assuming a diploma (Dip.) involves two years of full-time study.
Assuming a degree (Agel8-20/Deg.) involves three years of full-time study.
Assuming a degree (Agel8-21/Deg.) involves four years of full-time study.
Age 18-21/Deg. is under assumption of same proportion additional year income increased and full
employment probability. The rate of return for Age 18-21/Deg. will be less than that for Age 18-
20/Deg. if no assumption of full employment probability.
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